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The Litigation to Redefine Marriage: Equality and Social
Meaning
William C. Duncan∗
“The life of reason is our heritage and exists only
through tradition. Now the misfortune of revolutionists is
that they are disinherited, and their folly is that they wish to be
disinherited even more than they are.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, few litigation strategies have evoked
more comment, political turmoil, constitutional change, and legal
commentary as the effort to redefine marriage to include same-sex
couples. Nearly a dozen cases have been decided and more are now
pending. Two successful cases have led to state constitutional
amendments2 and the Federal Defense of Marriage Act.3
This article will describe the early same-sex marriage litigation, then
turn to the cases from the 1990’s before describing current same-sex
marriage litigation. I have assigned some cases to categories that are not
chronologically accurate because the context of the case makes them
more like cases from a previous era. Of course, the assignment may be
somewhat arbitrary.4

This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium”
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young
University. The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark
Law School, or Brigham Young University.
∗
Executive Director, Marriage and Family Law Research Grant, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
Brigham Young University.
1. JOHN BUCHAN, MEMORY HOLD-THE-DOOR 202 (1940) (quoting George Santayana).
2. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (see Kevin G. Clarkson, William C. Duncan & David Orgon
Coolidge, The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA
L. REV. 213 (1999)); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (see David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage
Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Constitutionality, 22 HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000)).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996) codified as1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. §
1738C (1997.
4. For instance, the Alaska case discussed in Part III bears a resemblance to the cases of the
1970s in posture. I have included it in its chronological context because of its outcome.
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The article will then make some observations about the changing
nature of the litigation in an attempt to explain the shift in success
between the first and second wave of cases attempting to redefine
marriage. Finally, it will speculate on the future of claims for same-sex
marriage: how they might arise and what they might bode for the social
meaning of marriage.
II. LONG SHOT: 1970S AND 1980S
Until the mid-1990s same-sex marriage litigation was always
something of a long shot. The first few cases illustrate the difficulty
plaintiffs had in convincing the courts to adopt their novel reasoning.
A. Minnesota
The first case in which a same-sex couple sought to compel a state to
grant them a marriage license began in Minnesota in 1970 when Jack
Baker and Michael McConnell filed suit.5 Both men saw their lawsuit as
part of a broader challenge to marriage and its place in the culture.6 The
Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in the case flatly rejected their
contentions. It first held that the State’s marriage statute could not be
construed to permit same-sex marriage since marriage is inherently
opposite-sex as evidenced by the dictionary definition of the term and the
use of gender specific terms in the family statutes.7 The court also
rejected plaintiffs’ due process claim on the basis of history, saying the
due process clause was not a charter for judicial legislation.8 They
distinguished Griswold v. Connecticut9 because that case assumed the
opposite-sex nature of marriage and dealt only with rights within
marriage.10 The court also rejected plaintiffs’ analogy to sterile couples
because the majority felt a fertility requirement would violate privacy
and because the distinction between same- and opposite-sex couples in
regards to procreative potential is largely accurate despite some
exceptions among opposite-sex couples.11 In regards to the plaintiffs’
equal protection claim, the court rejected their proffered analogy to

5. Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV.
15, 20 (2000).
6. Id.
7. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1972), dismissed for lack of substantial
federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1973).
8. Id. at 186.
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
11. Id. at 187.
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Loving v. Virginia,12 noting that this precedent related to race while the
relevant category in this case was sex, a fundamentally different
category.13
Although not widely recognized, this case also created U.S. Supreme
Court precedent on the same-sex marriage issue. The plaintiffs appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court in February 1972.14 The American Civil
Liberties Union declined to take the case, believing it might harm other
efforts, so the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union pursued the appeal
arguing that Minnesota’s marriage law constituted sex discrimination.15
When the Court rejected plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari, they
unanimously did so on the grounds that the case failed to raise a
substantial federal question.16 The Court has expressly noted that such a
decision is a ruling on the merits of the case.17 Thus, unless the Court
reconsiders, there is binding precedent to the effect that the U.S.
Constitution creates no right to redefine marriage to include same-sex
couples. It is also interesting to note that this decision came just six years
after the Supreme Court’s right to marry decision in Loving v. Virginia18
and despite an invitation from the plaintiffs to hold that Loving applied.19
B. Washington
The next same-sex marriage case arose in Seattle, Washington and
involved another male couple, also associated with a broader cultural
agenda.20 Their effort was also unsuccessful. The Washington Court of
Appeals, relying on gender specific language in the marriage-related
statutes, rejected plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation claim.21 An important
aspect of the court’s decision was its response to the plaintiffs’ claim that
marriage is a form of sex discrimination. First, the court held that the
state Equal Rights Amendment was not intended to redefine marriage,
rather its purpose was to protect women, not promote same-sex
marriage.22 It asserted that plaintiffs are unable to marry because of the
12. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
14. JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE
SUPREME COURT 167 (2001).
15. Id. at 168-69.
16. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1973). See also MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 14, at
171.
17. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
18. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. See Baker v. Nelson, Jurisdictional Statement at 14-17 (Feb. 11, 1973).
20. Johnson, supra note 5 at 22.
21. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 84 Wash. 2d
1008 (1974).
22. Id. at 1191, 1194.
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definition of marriage, not their sex.23 It specified that the Equal Rights
Amendment allows both sexes to access existing rights, it does not create
new rights.24 Finally, the court held that a law based on physical
differences is an exception even to the absolutist reading of the Equal
Rights Amendment.25 Since the State’s interest in marriage stems from
the value of propagation of humanity and same-sex couples are
absolutely unable to have children, the marriage law would fit the
physical difference exception to the Equal Rights Amendment.26 The
court also specified that the marriage law was to be reviewed under a
rational basis standard.27 It identified the close relationship between
marriage and the State’s interest in protecting the environment in which
children are raised as a rational basis supporting the law.28 The
Washington court also rejected the analogy to Loving saying Loving was
about race and did not involve a fundamental change in the nature of
marriage.29 Given all this, the court felt justified in deferring to the
legislature on the matter of changing the State’s definition of marriage.30
C. Kentucky
The first marriage case to involve a female couple arose in
Kentucky. The very brief decision arising from the controversy tracked
the other opinions by holding that, based on the historical nature of
marriage as well as its dictionary definition, same-sex couples are by
definition precluded from marriage.31 The court noted that while
marriage has changed over time, the sex requirement has been constant.32
Thus, the law recognizes but does not create the intrinsic nature of
marriage.33 The court rejected plaintiffs’ novel religious freedom claim
holding that a religious ceremony cannot trump state law.34 On another
novel claim, the court held that failure to issue a license was not a form
of punishment for purposes of the Eight Amendment.35

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1194.
Id.
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1192 n.8.
Id. at 1196 n.12.
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 590.
Id.
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D. Colorado
After the initial set of cases from the early 1970s, state courts were
silent for awhile. Then an immigration controversy brought the issue
squarely into the federal courts for the first time. In this case a same-sex
couple sought to have a religious commitment ceremony recognized as
marriage in order to gain preferential immigration status.36 Following a
marriage entered into solely to gain immigration status and its
annulment, an Australian citizen and his U.S. citizen same-sex partner
were “married” in a religious ceremony in Colorado where the county
clerk had issued them a marriage license.37 The State Attorney General
quickly declared the marriage invalid.38 When the couple returned to Los
Angeles, the INS began deportation proceedings for the Australian Tony
Sullivan.39 The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Mr. Sullivan’s
claim to be married to a U.S. citizen.40 The couple, represented by David
M. Brown (an attorney in the California “palimony” case Marvin v.
Marvin41), then sued in federal court, but their claim was rejected at the
trial court level.42 On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit held that,
relying on the Colorado Attorney General opinion and sex-specific
language in the statutes, Colorado’s statutory definition of marriage
precluded marriage by same-sex couples.43 In addition, relying on
historical analysis and the link between marriage and procreation, they
held that a marriage between persons of the same sex would violate
federal public policy.44 The court further rejected plaintiffs’ claim that
they were “putative spouses” because they could not have a good faith
belief in the validity of their marriage (i.e. all are on notice of invalidity
of such a marriage).45 The court relied on the rejection of the Baker v.
Nelson case by the U.S. Supreme Court for the proposition that the
constitutional questions are insubstantial.46 The court relied on the
intrinsically opposite-sex nature of marriage as further evidence that
there is no constitutional violation.47 They noted that the justification of
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
(1982).
44.
45.
46.
47.

Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 14, at 220.
Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 221.
Id.
557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 14, at 221.
Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111, 1122
Id. at 1123.
Id.
Id. at 1124.
Id.
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state recognition of marriage is procreation and, although that interest
may be overinclusive (meaning opposite-sex couples without the ability
or intent to have children are still allowed to marry), it needed to be so to
avoid privacy concerns (such as in examining a potential bride for
fertility).48 The court concluded that the opposite-sex definition of
marriage is the “least intrusive alternative available to protect the
procreative relationship”49 and that recognition of homosexuals in
discrimination laws or even legal recognition of same-sex relationships
does not raise same-sex unions to the level of a marriage.
E. Pennsylvania
In an atypical case, a same-sex couple in Pennsylvania sought a
divorce, claiming they had established a common-law marriage.50 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the nature of common-law
marriage is determined by reference to statutory marriage and
Pennsylvania law uses sex-specific terms, thus indicating the oppositesex nature of marriage.51 The court also reasoned that the law’s disfavor
of common-law marriages argues against expanding it to include samesex couples.52 The court said that the decision to expand the definition of
marriage is the legislature’s.53 No constitutional issues were heard in the
appeal because they had not been raised below.54
F. District of Columbia
In late 1990, two men sued after being denied a marriage license
from the clerk of the District of Columbia Superior Court.55 The D.C.
Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims in a decision producing
three separate opinions. The majority opinion by Judge Ferren dismissed
the claim that the marriage statute allowed for same-sex marriage, based
on (1) the fact that the D.C. Council had rejected a bill to allow same-sex
marriage, (2) gender-specific statutory language, (3) the traditional
understanding of marriage and (4) other state decisions.56 Judge Ferren
also held that the sex discrimination law of the District did not intend to

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 1125.
DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1984).
Id. at 954.
Id. at 955.
Id.
Id. at 956.
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (App. D.C. 1995).
Id. at 310.

10DUNCAN.MACRO

623]

5/26/2004 1:02 AM

LITIGATION TO REDEFINE MARRIAGE

629

redefine marriage and would have mentioned its intent to do if it had.57
The court held that there was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage
because it is not deeply rooted in the history and tradition of the
country.58 The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s discussion of
the right to marry had linked the right to procreation, which the court
took as indicating that the right would not include same-sex couples.59
The majority opinion concluded that the state interest in child bearing
provided a rational basis for marriage law.60
Judge Terry concurred in the decision, arguing that the inherent
nature of marriage makes same-sex marriage an impossibility.61 He also
argued that the court could not order a redefinition of marriage because
to do so would violate the principle of separation of powers.62
In another concurrence, Judge Steadman took issue with the
discrimination claims of the plaintiffs. He said that marriage laws are not
motivated by purposeful intent to discriminate against homosexuals.63
Because the law applied equally to men and women, he thought it
appropriate to reject the sex discrimination claim.64 He did not think an
examination of the claim for suspect class status based on sexual
orientation was necessary because even if the statute applied unequally to
homosexuals (and homosexuals were a suspect class), the absence of a
right to same-sex marriage prevented an equal protection problem.65 To
bolster this claim, he reasoned that if sodomy can be criminalized, a
relationship based on it cannot rise to the level of a constitutional right.66
In the portion of his opinion dissenting from the court’s disposition
of the case, Judge Ferren argued that public moral disapproval of
homosexuality was not enough to justify the law.67 He would have
required the state to show concrete harm (preferably in statistics) to
establish a substantial or compelling interest.68 Thus, he felt a remand
was needed for a trial on the level of scrutiny and compelling interest
(including whether homosexuality is immutable).69 He believed that the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 316, 320.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 361 (Terry, J., concurring).
Id. at 362.
Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id. at 363 n.5.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 358.
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argument that marriage is inherently homosexual was just like arguments
supporting anti-miscegenation laws because same-sex couples want to
marry for the same reasons opposite-sex couples do.70 He further argued
that the marriage law was not just disparate in its impact, it excludes all
couples in the affected class and that laws can be discriminatory without
a discriminatory intent.71
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:1990S TO THE PRESENT
Professor Greg Johnson suggests that the second wave of same-sex
marriage lawsuits differed from the first in its more narrow focus on
securing marriage licenses rather than advancing broad cultural aims.72
This second group of cases was certainly more strategic. Most
importantly, these cases were more successful.
A. Hawaii
The breakthrough case for putting the definition of marriage on the
national stage, initiated just after the Dean litigation, arose in Hawaii. In
1990, after failing to gain the support of national groups, local activist
Bill Woods recruited three same-sex couples to challenge Hawaii’s
marriage law.73 The trial court dismissed the case in 1991.74 The Hawaii
Supreme Court issued its decision in the case in 1993.75 The case
produced three opinions. The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Moon
and Justice Levinson sharply diverged from previous decisions on the
subject. While they held that the fundamental right to marriage
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court only applies to opposite-sex
marriage and that same-sex marriage was not rooted in the traditions of
the constitution, the matter did not end there.76 Like previous decisions,
the court held that the statutory language could not be understood to
allow same-sex marriage (relying on sex-specific statutory language).77
The court also held that there was no fundamental right to marriage
under Hawaii’s due process clause.78

70. Id. at 359.
71. Id. at 359-60.
72. Johnson, supra note 5, at 22.
73. David Orgon Coolidge, In Same-Sex ‘Marriage’ Fight, Courts Try an End Run, NAT’L
CATH. REG. 1 (Feb. 7-13, 1999).
74. Id.
75. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
76. Id. at 56-57.
77. Id. at 60.
78. Id. at 57.
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The divergence began with the court’s treatment of the equal
protection claims of the plaintiffs. The court approached these on the
premise that marriage is a state-created status.79 The court then ruled that
the marriage law employed a sex classification on its face.80 The court
further held that marriage is a sex-based classification because it takes
into account the sex of one of the parties.81 Since, as the court held, sexbased classifications are subject to strict scrutiny under the State Equal
Rights Amendment, the marriage statute was thus presumed
unconstitutional unless the State was able to show a compelling interest
in the law.82 The court rejected the State’s argument that the dual-sex
nature of marriage is intrinsic to its definition as circular.83 The court also
rejected the State’s proffered interest in procreation as a justification for
the law by saying that impotent persons may marry.84 The court
distinguished the Pennsylvania DeSanto case because it involved
common-law marriage.85 It rejected Baker v. Nelson because that case
involved federal constitutional claims.86 Perhaps, most importantly, it
rejected the holdings in Jones v. Hallahan and Singer v. Hara by analogy
to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Loving v. Virginia in which the
trial court had suggested that interracial marriages were an
impossibility.87 Relying on this analogy, suggested in an amicus brief
before the court filed by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
the court finally rejected the State’s defense that the law applied equally
to both men and women.88
Judge Burns concurred in the court’s judgment but also suggested
that there was a question of fact as to whether homosexuality constitutes
a discrete sex.89 The dissenters, Judge Heen and Justice Hayashi, agreed
with the plurality that the right to marry does not mean a right to samesex marriage.90 However, they rejected the equal protection claim
because they believed the marriage law did not discriminate because it
treats both sexes the same.91 They also believed the marriage law was
79. Id. at 58.
80. Id. at 60.
81. Id. at 64.
82. Id. at 67.
83. Id. at 61.
84. Id. at 49 n.1.
85. Id. at 61.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 63.
88. Id. at 67; see David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and
the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201, 206 (1998).
89. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69-70.
90. Id. at 71.
91. Id.
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justified by the State’s rational basis in encouraging procreation.92
Finally, the dissenters said that redress for plaintiffs claim should come
from the legislature, not the court.93
The case thus went back to the circuit court level where the State
would be required to rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality by
demonstrating a compelling interest in the current definition of marriage.
At this point, Evan Wolfson of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund became co-counsel in the case.94 The trial began September 10,
1996 and lasted two weeks.95 The trial consisted of “dueling socialscience experts” attempting to either establish or rebut the one ground on
which the State chose to make its defense: the possibility of harm to
children if marriage were redefined to include same-sex couples.96 At
one point, the trial devolved into attacks on the credentials of State
witnesses based on their personal religious beliefs.97
Judge Chang issued his opinion on December 3, 1996.98 The opinion
made a number of findings including that a father and mother are not
essential to a child’s healthy development, that homosexual parents can
raise healthy children, and that the State had demonstrated no causal link
between same-sex marriage and negative outcomes for children.99 In fact,
the court believed children would be assisted by same-sex marriage since
it allows same-sex couples with children to access marital benefits.100
Judge Chang said that same-sex couples want to marry for the same
kinds of reasons as opposite-sex couples and that same-sex marriage will
not harm any government interest.101 The conclusion was clear: Hawaii’s
marriage statute was unconstitutional.102
The State immediately appealed, and before the Hawaii Supreme
Court could address the lower court’s opinion, the Hawaii Legislature
proposed and the people of Hawaii approved (by a 69-31 margin) a state

92. Id. at 73.
93. Id. at 74.
94. Coolidge, supra note 88, at 206 n.14.
95. David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of
Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1997).
96. David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage: As Hawaii Goes . . ., FIRST THINGS 33 (Apr.
1997).
97. David Orgon Coolidge, Marriage on Trial: Leaving it to the Experts, HAW. CATH.
HERALD 1 (Sept. 20, 1996).
98. Baehr v. Miike, Docket No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
99. Id. at 17.
100. Id. at 18.
101. Id. at 18, 21.
102. Id. at 22.
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constitutional amendment reserving to the legislature the power to define
marriage.103
B. Alaska
In 1995, Jay Brause and Gene Dugan owners of the Out North
Contemporary Art House and long-time “political activists” filed suit
challenging Alaska’s marriage law.104 Anchorage Superior Court Judge
Peter Michalski issued an opinion in 1998 that was startlingly
sympathetic to the arguments.105 The court held that it could not just
accept the traditional understanding of marriage.106 The court then
broadly construed the State constitution’s right to privacy to include the
fundamental right to choose one’s life partner.107 For the court, the
individual’s decision was the fundamental unit of analysis and the denial
of that right mandated strict scrutiny.108 Almost as an afterthought, the
court accepted the argument that marriage is a sex-based classification
which invokes intermediate scrutiny, although this was moot since a
fundamental privacy right was already found.109 Thus, Judge Michalski
ordered a trial to be held to determine if the State has a compelling
interest justifying its marriage law.110 Before the trial took place, the
legislature proposed and an overwhelming majority of Alaskans
approved a state constitutional amendment defining marriage as the
union of a man and a woman.111
C. Vermont
Professor Greg Johnson has noted that significant legal gains by
same-sex couples preceded the high profile litigation in Vermont,
including the appointment of gay and lesbian “co-liaisons” to the
governor in 1986, the enactment of a “hate crimes” law in 1990, and the
inclusion of “sexual orientation” as a discrete category in the state’s antidiscrimination law in 1992.112 The Vermont Freedom to Marry Task
Force was founded in 1995 and public relations work began before the

103. Coolidge, supra note 73.
104. Johnson, supra note 5, at 22-23.
105. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, Docket No. 3AN-95-6562 CI 1998 WL 88743
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 4.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2.
111. See Clarkson, Duncan & Coolidge, supra note 2.
112. Johnson, supra note 5, at 28.
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case on behalf of three same-sex couples was actually filed in July
1997.113 In December 1997, this case was dismissed on a motion by the
State, and plaintiffs appealed.114 During the long wait for the supreme
court’s opinion, the work of the Task Force seemed to pay off when the
Governor’s Commission on Women gave an award to the plaintiffs in the
case for their “courage” in pursuing the litigation.115 This provoked a
minor disturbance, though, when a group opposed to the redefinition of
marriage pointed out that one of the Commission members was married
to a Vermont Supreme Court justice before whom the case was
pending.116
Not long before Christmas 1999, the court finally issued its closely
watched opinion.117 All of the justices concurred in the result that the
State’s marriage law was constitutionally infirm, but with a significant
twist. The majority opinion first dismissed religious and moral issues as
irrelevant.118 They then joined the unanimous opinion among courts
addressing the issue, holding that the statutory definition of marriage
requires a man and a woman (relying on the dictionary definition,
common law, and other statutory language).119 The state constitutional
analysis, however, was significantly different from anything that had
come before. The majority first said that the appropriate constitutional
analysis under the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution
is based on principle of “inclusion.”120 Thus, according to the majority, if
a statute is not “inclusive,” the State must show it is “reasonably
necessary” to advance a state objective.121 Before looking at the
objectives of the statute, the majority summarily dismissed the sex
discrimination argument, holding that the marriage statute was neutral as
to sex and that the purpose of marriage law was not to disadvantage one
sex.122
The majority dismissed the asserted state interest in maintaining the
link between procreation and child rearing, calling it underinclusive
because some married couples cannot have children and some same-sex

113.
114.
115.
116.
1999).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 33.
See Nancy Remsen, Justice Dooley Challenged, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS 1 (Sept. 21,
Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
Id. at 867.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id. at 880 n.13.
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couples do.123 The majority further held that the link between procreation
and child rearing had already been severed by the existence of artificial
reproductive technology.124 The majority said that the link between
procreation and child rearing does not advance a substantial interest
because same-sex and married couples are the same in regards to rearing
children.125 Also, since Vermont already allowed same-sex couples to
adopt, state policy doesn’t really favor child-rearing by married
couples.126
The majority also dismissed some of the State’s other justifications
for its marriage law.127 They held that existing differences in Vermont
marriage law from that of other states defeated the claim that Vermont
had an interest in consistency with other states.128 They also held that
Vermont’s sexual orientation discrimination law, adoption law, and other
similar statutes undermine the State’s claim that its public policy
disfavors the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.129
The majority had noted that the benefits of marriage are so great that
only a substantial interest could justify the exclusion of same-sex couples
and having dismissed all justifications held that the Vermont constitution
requires benefits of marriage to be extended to same-sex couples.130 The
majority did not, however, order the State to issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples. In fact, they held that the legislature can decide
whether to redefine marriage or create a substantially similar option for
same-sex couples.131 Lest the majority be accused of deferring to the
legislature though, the court specified that if the legislature did not
provide the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples, the court would
retain jurisdiction and order the issuance of marriage licenses to samesex couples.132
In concurring, Justice Dooley accused the court of making a decision
without any principled basis.133 He noted that all previous Vermont case
law had at least applied federal constitutional analysis.134 Thus, he felt
that the court’s approach allowed too much judicial discretion so that the

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 881.
Id. at 882.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 884-86.
Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 884, 886.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 887.
Id. at 893 (Dooley, J., concurring).
Id. at 894.
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judges were acting like legislators.135 Justice Dooley would however, not
have followed federal precedent because he believed Vermont’s legal
climate was more favorable to homosexuals than the federal climate.136
Instead, he would have followed the analysis of an Oregon Court of
Appeals decision and held that homosexual persons constitute a suspect
class.137 Thus, he believed that although marriage statutes are facially
neutral, they have a disparate impact based on sexual orientation and
would be unconstitutional.138
The court’s attempt to draw a “compromise” position drew a strong
dissent from Justice Johnson who believed that the court’s remedy
involves the court too much in the legislative process and does not
decrease uncertainty for plaintiffs.139 She would have ordered marriage
licenses for the plaintiffs.140 Her rationale was that denying marriage
licenses to same-sex couples is sex discrimination since the sex of one
party is taken into account.141 Further, she believed same-sex marriage is
a logical extension of the state public policy enacted in Vermont’s sexual
orientation discrimination law.142
In response to the court’s mandate, the Vermont Legislature created
a new status called “civil unions,” which allowed same-sex couples to
take advantage of all of the benefits of marriage under another name.143
D. Massachusetts
In April 2001, seven same-sex couples represented by the co-counsel
in the Vermont case, filed suit in the Suffolk County Superior Court
making the familiar claims for marriage licenses.144 The plaintiffs
however, made clear that they did not want to obtain some kind of civil
union status as in Vermont.145 On a motion for summary judgment, the
judge concurred with previous decisions in holding that the word
marriage in Massachusetts statutes refers to the union of a man and a
woman, as evidenced by the use of gender specific terms in the statute

135. Id. at 897.
136. Id. at 891.
137. Id. at 893.
138. Id. at 890.
139. Id. at 898 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 905.
142. Id. at 902 n.5.
143. See David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for a
Vermont Marriage Amendment, 25 VT. L. REV. 61 (2000).
144. Yvonne Abraham, Gays Seek Right to Marry, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 12, 2001, at A1.
145. Id.
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and the history of the marriage institution.146 Relying on separation of
powers principles the court held that it was required to defer to the state
marriage statute unless the plaintiff can show there is no conceivable
grounds to support its validity.147 The court did find such a ground:
“Recognizing that procreation is marriage’s central purpose, it is rational
for the Legislature to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples who,
theoretically, are capable of procreation.”148 The court summarily
dismissed plaintiffs’ claim that the marriage law violated the state Equal
Rights Amendment because the Amendment does not apply to
discrimination on the basis of “sexual orientation.”149 Further, the court
noted that Massachusetts had no provision analogous to Vermont’s
common benefits clause that would support a finding that the marriage
statute is unconstitutional and that Article 6 of the Massachusetts
Constitution is only violated if a statute’s purpose is to confer special
privileges on a particular group.150 Most of the opinion focused on the
question of a due process right to same-sex marriage. The court held that
the Massachusetts constitution recognizes only rights “deeply rooted in
the Commonwealth’s history and tradition” as fundamental and the
definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman is “deeply
rooted in our Commonwealth’s legal tradition and practice.”151 Plaintiffs’
novel claims for marriage licenses based on rights of speech and
association were also rejected.152 Given all this, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs’ request should properly be directed to the legislature, not
the courts.153
The plaintiffs appealed and oral argument was held in the Supreme
Judicial Court (SJC) in March 2003.154 The SJC handed down its
decision on November 17, 2003 and what it lacked in promptness it
made up in novelty.155 The SJC framed the question raised in the debate
as “whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the
Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits, and obligations
conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish

146. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, Docket No. 20011647A, 2002 WL 1299135 at *2
(Mass. Super. May 7, 2002).
147. Id. at *5.
148. Id. at *13.
149. Id. at *5 n.6.
150. Id. at *6-7.
151. Id. at *10.
152. Id. at *11.
153. Id.
154. Kathleen Burge, SJC Peppers Lawyers on Same-Sex Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5,
2003, at A1.
155. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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to marry.”156 The succinct answer of four of the court’s seven judges
was: “We conclude that it may not.”157 In its opinion, the majority noted
the deep cultural divisions surrounding the proposal to redefine marriage
to include same-sex couples.158 It cavalierly swept these aside though,
quoting Lawrence v. Texas to assure the people of Massachusetts that it
was “defin[ing] the liberty of all, not . . . mandat[ing] our own moral
code.”159 In the first section of the opinion, the court went to great length
to portray the plaintiffs in a most positive light even including the
improbable statement that some of the same-sex couples lived with
“their” children, conveniently ignoring the reality that these children
somewhere have at least one other parent not mentioned in this case
(unless procreative technology has taken a leap of which all of us have
been unaware).160 The court then turned to the claim that since
Massachusetts law has not included a specific statutory definition of
marriage it could already include same-sex couples.161 Like all of the
previous decisions from other states, the court rejected this claim.162
The decision goes to some effort in multiple places to assure us that
their opinion is based on the provisions of the Massachusetts
Constitution so as to avoid any possibility of review by the U.S. Supreme
Court.163 The opinion, however, cites liberally from asides in U.S.
Supreme Court decisions which are treated as a sort of Bartlett’s
Quotations, providing support for the most free-ranging of the court’s
conclusions (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Griswold v. Connecticut,
Roe v. Wade, Lawrence v. Texas, Romer v. Evans and even the interracial
adoption case Palmore v. Sidoti).164 In its constitutional analysis the court
specifically rejected any role for the history of marriage as a social
institution.165 Instead, the court portrays “civil marriage” as a “wholly
secular institution” created by the government.166 To further stigmatize
historical precedent, the court rolls out the anti-miscegenation analogy
(some believe marriage has a social meaning that precludes its gender-

156. Id. at 948.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 566 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
160. Id. at 949.
161. Id. at 952.
162. Id. at 952-53.
163. Id. at 948-49, 953.
164. Id. at 948, 955, 958, 959, 962, 968.
165. Id. at 954 (“Simply put, the government creates civil marriage.”).
166. Id. at 954.
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neutral redefinition but they used to say the same thing about interracial
marriages).167
The court’s constitutional analysis is somewhat difficult to pin down.
The opinion says it is assessing the law against constitutional guarantees
of both individual liberty and equality but does not separate out the
two.168 The court specifically claims to be employing the very deferential
“rational basis” test for determining the law’s validity but gives almost
no deference to the interests the State asserted in support of the existing
marriage law.169 Indeed, the opinion approvingly cites the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Romer v. Evans to support its conclusion that the
current marriage law “confers an official stamp of approval on the
destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable
and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of
respect.”170
To the court, civil marriage is an evolving paradigm.”171 The court
does note four purposes of marriage laws: (1) encouraging stable
relationships over transient ones, (2) providing for orderly property
distribution, (3) decreasing the state’s obligation to provide for the
needy, and (4) providing a way to track important epidemiological and
demographic data.”172 In contrast, the court assessed the interests
asserted by the State in favor of its marriage law: (1) “providing a
‘favorable setting for procreation;’” (2) increasing the number of
children who are raised by a mother and father, the optimal setting for
child rearing; and (3) preserving state resources.173 The court rejects the
first because some married couples cannot or do not have children and
some same-sex couples do.174 It rejects the second because the state
already recognizes same-sex couple headed households and because it
believes that the children raised in these households would be benefited
if the couple were receiving marital benefits.175 It rejects the third interest
because same-sex couples are as deserving of state benefits as others and
marriage doesn’t require dependency between spouses.176 To this court,
marriage seems to be just one of the many arrows in the quiver of public
welfare providers.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 958.
Id. at 969.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 961.
Id.
Id. at 963-64.
Id. at 964.
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In its decision, the court specifically notes its rejection of “centuries”
of tradition but suggests that doing so will not harm the value of
marriage.177 Rather, the court believes that “extending civil marriage to
same-sex couples reinforces the importance of marriage to individuals
and communities.”178 The court says that “[t]he marriage ban works a
deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the community for
no rational reason.”179 This, to the court, “suggests that the marriage
restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are (or
who are believed to be) homosexual.”180
In its conclusion, the court followed the recent example of the
Ontario Court of Appeals, calling their redefinition of marriage a
“refine[ment of] the common law.”181 Specifically, the court provided a
new official legal definition of marriage in Massachusetts: “the voluntary
union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.”182
Having found marriage unconstitutional, the court stayed the effect of its
ruling 180 days in which the legislature could “take such action as it may
deem appropriate in light of this opinion.”183
One of the justices, Justice Greaney, in the majority wrote a separate
opinion arguing that the court decided correctly but should have held that
marriage was a form of sex discrimination.184 Justice Greaney’s opinion
included a somewhat condescending note to those who disagree: “Simple
principles of decency dictate that we extend to the plaintiffs, and to their
new status, full acceptance, tolerance and respect. We should do so
because it is the right thing to do.”185
There were also three dissenting opinions. Justice Spina would have
held that the definition of marriage is a matter for the legislature to
decide.186 He argued that neither sex is disadvantaged by the marriage
law so it is not a form of sex discrimination and that the law does not
take into account a person’s subjective sexual orientation.187 He rejected
the anti-miscegenation analogy arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court had
invalidated such laws not as a way of protecting personal choice but of

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 965.
Id.
Id. at 968.
Id.
Id. at 969.
Id.
Id. at 970.
Id. at 970-78 (Greaney, J., concurring).
Id. at 973 (Greaney, J. concurring).
Id. at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
Id. at 974-75 (Spina, J., dissenting).
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defeating invalid racial distinctions.188 He notes that the majority opinion
has redefined marriage and that the court’s definition is not, as traditional
constitutional analysis requires, deeply rooted in our country’s history
and tradition.189
In her dissent, Justice Sosman argued that the court was not really
using the rational basis test of constitutionality despite it claim to the
contrary.190 Instead the court has assessed the marriage law under higher
levels of scrutiny without admitting it.191 She also noted that many
people raise children outside of marriage without any claim that they
ought to be given the benefits of marriage.192 She said that it is not for the
court to weigh the evidence of the best environment for children, rather
that is a legislative function.193 She accused the court of allowing the
emotional nature of the plaintiffs’ claim to distract it from the traditional
deference it should give a claim lacking any supporting evidence.194
Justice Cordy offered the final dissenting opinion. He also would
have deferred to the legislature.195 Specifically, he pointed out the court’s
implicit assumption that marriage is a unisex institution despite the fact
that all previous right to marry cases had accepted the intrinsic nature of
marriage as a social institution bringing the sexes together.196 He strongly
criticized the majority’s constitutional analysis (the right of privacy can’t
mean the right to state endorsement, same-sex marriage is not rooted in
our country’s history and tradition, etc.).197 Justice Cordy also argued
that the state interests in marriage are not irrational, noting that marriage
has always been understood as the appropriate context for procreation
and child rearing because sexual intercourse between men and women
can result in conception (unlike other sexual relationships).198 He noted
that marriage has successfully advanced this interest throughout time and
that the relevant social science research comparing children raised by
same-sex couples is small, methodologically flawed, and tentative.199
Thus, the state could rationally decide that it is not ready to redefine
marriage.200 He argued that adoption does not defeat the state’s interest
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. (Spina, J. dissenting).
Id. at 976-77 (Spina, J., dissenting).
Id. at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 969-70 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 979. (Sosman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 980 (Sosman, J. dissenting).
Id. at 981-82 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 983-94 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 998-99 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 999-1000 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
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because a child available to be adopted has already lost the optimal
family setting.201 He also rejected the court’s contention that the state’s
refusal to ban certain types of family forms means that it cannot favor
one type.202 He wrote that if marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples,
marriage can continue to offer the message that procreation should take
place in marriage.203
IV. CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
The marriage litigation is by no means over yet. Three prominent
cases challenging state marriage laws are pending currently and related
controversies may provide for future litigation.
A. Indiana
In August 2002, three same-sex couples represented by the Indiana
Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit in the Marion County Superior
Court seeking to compel the county clerk to issue them marriage
licenses.204 The couples’ complaint also noted that each of the parties had
contracted a Vermont civil union and included a plea that those unions be
recognized if marriage licenses were not issued.205 The State filed a
motion to dismiss and oral arguments were held March 30, 2003.206
On May 7, 2003, Judge S.K. Reid granted the State’s motion.207 The
court held that the Indiana Constitution does not provide a right to marry
a person of one’s choice and that the federal right to marry also does not
extend that far.208 The decision distinguished anti-miscegenation laws as
imposing an extrinsic requirement to marriage in contrast to sex
distinctions which are intrinsic to the nature of marriage.209 The court
found that the marriage statute easily survives rational basis scrutiny
because it furthers three state interests.210 The first State interest is
encouraging procreation where both biological parents are present to

201. Id. at 1000 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1000-01 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 1001-03 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
204. Beth Rosenberg, Couples Sue for Same-Sex Unions in Indiana, EVANSVILLE COURIER &
PRESS, Aug. 23, 2002, at B9.
205. Attorney General Seeks Dismissal of Same-Sex Marriage Suit, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan.
4, 2003, at B1.
206. Tim Evans, Lawyers Debate Same-Sex Marriage, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 1, 2003, at
B5.
207. Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-0211-PL-001946 2003 WL 23119998 (Ind. Super. Ct.
May 7, 2003).
208. Id. at 7.
209. Id. at 8.
210. Id. at 9.
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raise children.211 Same-sex couples, by contrast, cannot reproduce.212 The
second interest identified by the court was the promotion of the
traditional family as the basic unit of society.213 The final interest was the
protection of the integrity of marriage since the theories underlying
same-sex marriage could apply to other situations.214 For these same
reasons, the court held that the marriage statute does not constitute a due
process violation.215 In regards to the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims,
the court held that the State’s marriage statute was neutral in regards to
the sex of the parties and that the intrinsic difference between same- and
opposite-sex couples justifies any differences in legal treatment.216 An
appeal of that decision is currently pending.
B. New Jersey
While the Massachusetts case was pending, Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund recruited seven same-sex couples to challenge New
Jersey’s marriage law.217 That case is pending at the trial court level.
C. Nebraska
Just less than a year after the New Jersey case was filed, an unusual
case was filed in federal district court in Nebraska. Brought by an
advocacy group and five couples represented by the American Civil
Liberties Union, it was a facial challenge to a provision of the Nebraska
Constitution, Section 29, enacted in 2000, which provided that the State
would not recognize same-sex marriages or similar statuses.218 The
plaintiffs were quick to note they were not seeking marriage licenses,
though.219 The State moved to dismiss the case on standing grounds and
that motion is pending.220

211. Id.
212. Id. at 10.
213. Id. at 10-11.
214. Id. at 12-13.
215. Id. at 14.
216. Id. at 15.
217. Kate Coscarelli, Same-Sex Couples Sue for Right to Marry in N.J., NEWARK STARLEDGER, June 27, 2003, at 17.
218. Todd Cooper, Suit Filed Over Defense of Marriage Law, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr.
30, 2003, at 1B.
219. Id.
220. Henry J. Cordes, Rights Battle Turns to Nebraska, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 2,
2003, at 1A.
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D. Hybrid Claims
At the same time as these cases have challenged the legal view of
marriage, two important lines of cases with implications for the issue of
redefining marriage have been going on. In the first, plaintiffs seek to
gain the benefits associated with marriage without specifically seeking
marriage licenses.221 The underpinning of the claim is the use of
“disparate impact” analysis, disavowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Fourteenth Amendment cases, to show that since same-sex couples are
disproportionately denied the benefits of marriage, laws which provide
for tangible benefits based on marital status are a type of “sexual
orientation” discrimination.222 The first case in which this idea was
adopted came out of litigation in which same-sex couples, one of whom
was employed by Oregon Health Sciences University, challenged the
provision of employment benefits only to spouses of employees.223 The
court of appeals held that there was no valid justification for the denial of
benefits, and thus, that the policy was discriminatory.224 A New York
Court of Appeals decision involving a same-sex couple seeking to live in
married student housing at a private university was remanded to the trial
court to give the plaintiffs a chance to “establish that [the university’s]
policy regarding university-owned housing with non-students
disproportionately burdens lesbians and gay men.”225 If they establish
this, the university would have to show (as the New York City Code
requires) that the policy bears a “significant relationship to a significant
business objective.”226 Cases making similar claims have been rejected at
the trial court levels in Alaska227 and Montana228 and are pending on
appeal.
The second line of cases arises out of the Vermont Supreme Court’s
mandate of civil union benefits. In these cases, plaintiffs seek to gain
some recognition in other states of civil unions they contracted in
221. These cases are discussed in Joshua K. Baker, Status, Benefits, and Recognition: Current
Controversies in the Marriage Debate, 18 BYU J. Pub. L. 569 (2004).
222. See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 82 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“But facially
neutral laws that have a disparate impact are a different animal for purposes of constitutional
analysis than laws that specifically provide for disparate treatment. We have long held that the
differential impact of a facially neutral law does not trigger heightened scrutiny . . . .”).
223. Tanner v. Oregon Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 439 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). For more
on this case, see David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Marriage and Democracy in
Oregon: The Meaning and Implications of Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 36
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 503 (2000).
224. Id. at 448.
225. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 730 N.Y.S.2d 15, 23 (N.Y. 2001).
226. Id. (quoting N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(17)(a)(2)).
227. ACLU v. Anchorage, Ak. Super. Ct. No. 3AN-99-11179 CIV (Nov. 16, 2001).
228. Snetsinger v. Montana University System, No. CDV-2002-097 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 2002).
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Vermont. In the first, a woman who had been found in contempt of court
for violating a custody agreement with her ex-husband by allowing her
same-sex partner to stay with her overnight while her children were
visiting, asserted that her civil union contracted with the partner in
Vermont should be recognized as a marriage in Georgia for purposes of
the custody agreement.229 The court of appeals rejected the claim holding
that the civil union was not a marriage and that even if the couple had
been able to enter a same-sex marriage, it would not be recognized as
legally valid in Georgia given the Georgia state marriage recognition
law, the federal Defense of Marriage Act, and the fact that the definition
of marriage is a question to be left to the legislature rather than the
judiciary.230
In Connecticut, one partner in a Vermont civil union attempted to get
a Connecticut court to dissolve the union.231 The court held that the union
was not a marriage and thus could not be dissolved by a Connecticut
court.232 In a similar case, a Texas couple who had contracted a civil
union sought a divorce in Beaumont County, Texas.233 The judge had
initially granted the divorce, but rescinded that order after the state
attorney general intervened in the case, at which point the petition was
withdrawn.234
One case of this type has been successful, though. It involved a claim
for wrongful death of a partner in a civil union, and the trial court held
that the plaintiff’s civil union should be treated as a marriage in the
narrow context of a wrongful death action.235
V. OBSERVATIONS ON THREE DECADES OF LITIGATION
At least four trends have contributed to the acceptance of claims for
redefining marriage, and have in turn been driven by the increasing
acceptance of these claims.
A. Strategy
The first trend is the increasing sophistication of the lawsuits being
brought to gain the redefinition of marriage. All of the early cases (until
the Hawaii litigation) involved only one couple, though often, as has
229. Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
230. Id. at 49.
231. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
232. Id.
233. Judge Dismisses Request for Same-Sex Divorce, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 2,
2003, at 9.
234. Id.
235. Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of New York, 229 N.Y. L.J. 23 (Apr. 18, 2003).
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been noted above, the plaintiffs saw their lawsuit as part of a broader
radical agenda. It also does not appear that the forums were chosen for
any particular reason or that serious public relations efforts were
employed.
Professor Patricia Cain suggests that in the 1970s, gay rights
organizations made a conscious choice to pursue a litigation strategy,
partly because “lobbying for legislative change could not be supported
by tax-deductible contributions, but that litigating for judicial change
could be.”236 Still, marriage did not seem to be on the litigation agenda in
a serious way until the 1990s. The shift in strategy is illustrated by the
Hawaii litigation which involved three couples chosen by an activist.
Similarly, the Vermont case involved three couples, some in long-term
relationships, and with a mix of men and women. As Professor Greg
Johnson notes, “one thing that distinguishes Vermont is the remarkable
amount of planning and coordination which preceded and accompanied
the push for equal marriage rights.”237
Along these same lines, the cases that have been initiated since the
1990s have tended to involve large national or regional organizations
with significant litigation experience. Although the American Civil
Liberties Union affiliate initially chose not to participate in the Hawaii
suit, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund joined the case after
the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision and Evan Wolfson, director of
Lambda’s Marriage Project, became co-counsel.238 Mary Bonauto of
New England’s Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders served as cocounsel in the Vermont and Massachusetts cases.239 The American Civil
Liberties Union and its affiliates have been involved in the Indiana and
Nebraska lawsuits as well as all of the suits seeking marital benefits for
same sex couples.240 Professor Cain has also noted that these national
groups have increasingly been able to coordinate their litigation
projects.241
The importance of these groups in the marriage litigation cannot be
understated. They command significant resources. In 1994, the Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project at the ACLU had a budget of nearly $1 million
and “participate[d] in more lesbian and gay rights litigation than any

236. PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE
LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 56 (2000).
237. Johnson, supra note 5, at 26.
238. See supra Part III.A.
239. See supra Parts III.C-D.
240. See supra Part IV.
241. PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE
LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 64 (2000).
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other organization in the country.”242 The annual budget of the ACLU
today is about $50 million.243 In 2002, Lambda received a grant of
$130,000 from the Gill Foundation244 and $300,000 from the Ford
Foundation.245 Lambda Legal’s website notes 110 employers who match
employee contributions to the Fund.246 The home page also notes the
sponsorship of such corporations as United Airlines, LexisNexis and
others.247 Lambda’s budget for fiscal year 2002 indicates $5,680,400 for
legal and education efforts, grants of $1,448,372 from foundations, and
$3,936,847 from individuals.248
These organizations also benefit from significant cooperation from
outside attorneys and law firms.249 Lambda lists financial contributions
from ninety-three law firms.250 It also notes pro bono support from thirtythree attorneys or law firms and boasts a cooperating attorney network.251
B. Cultural Changes
Obviously though, strategic thinking and plentiful resources alone do
not deliver legal victories. Clear cultural shifts have also been at work.
While it is obviously beyond the scope of this article to outline all of the
changes in public opinion related to sexual behavior, a brief mention of
three general legal trends will at least hint at some of the shifts that may
have made the effort to redefine marriage seem more reasonable to the
courts addressing the issue.
In his significant article on the transformation of family law,
Professor Carl Schneider quotes Max Weber as follows:
All systems of ethics, no matter what the substantive content, can be
divided into two main groups. There is the “heroic” ethic, which
imposes on men demands of principle to which they are generally not

242. Id. at 69.
243. $8 Million Gift Will Boost ACLU Campaign to Fight Bush Administration’s Assault on
Civil Liberties, ACLU press release Jan. 15, 2003, at http://www.aclu.org/news.
244. Gill Foundation Awards More Than $1 MILLION in Grants to Support Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) Movement, HIV/AIDS Programming, ASCRIBE NEWS, Apr. 18, 2002.
245. Ford Foundation, Grants Database at http://www.fordfound.org/grants_db/
view_grant_detail1.cfm (last visited May 1, 2004).
246. Lambda Legal, Matching Gifts at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/join/gifts.
247. See http://www.lambdalegal.org (last visited May 6, 2004).
248. Making It Happen: Lambda Legal Annual Report 2002 at 54-55 (May 28, 2003) at
www.lambdalegal.org/binary_data/LAMBA_PDF/pdf/221.pdf (on file with the BYU Journal of
Public Law).
249. See Federalist Society, Pro Bono Activities at the AMLaw 100, ABA WATCH, Feb. 2001.
250. Making It Happen: Lambda Legal Annual Report 2002 at 58-69 (May 28, 2003) at
www.lambdalegal.org/binary_data/LAMBA_PDF/pdf/221.pdf (on file with the BYU Journal of
Public Law).
251. Id. The Cooperating Attorney Network at http://www.lmabdalegal.org.
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able to do justice, except at the high points of their lives, but which
serve as signposts pointing the way for man’s endless striving. Or there
is the “ethic of the mean,” which is content to accept man’s everyday
“nature” as setting a maximum for the demands which can be made.252

Professor Schneider notes that there has been an associated change in the
nature of moral discourse: namely, a change away from aspirational
morality.”253 He contrasts nineteenth century family law which “set a
standard of behavior not readily attainable” of “an ideal of lifelong
marital fidelity and responsibility” with modern family law which “not
only rejects some of the old standards as meaningless, undesirable, or
wrong,” but “also hesitates to set standards that cannot readily be
enforced or that go beyond the minimal responsibility expressed in the
can phrase, ‘do your own thing, as long as you don’t hurt anybody
else.’”254 Perhaps the best practical illustration of this shift has been the
successful effort to remove fault grounds from the law of divorce (either
completely or by coupling them with no-fault grounds).255 Similarly,
advocacy for redefining marriage often includes a variation of the theme,
“the law should reflect the reality of how people are living.”256 The
reality of same-sex couples raising children was important to the
Vermont Supreme Court in its decision.257 Conversely, the aspirational
argument that children deserve the ideal setting for childrearing (a
mother and father) did not fare well in the Hawaii trial court.258
Accompanying a decline in the favor shown to normative judgments
in family law has been a decline in the “family’s institutional
strength.”259 As Professor Bruce Hafen has noted, “family law now
reflects less confidence in the value of marriage- and kinship-based
models of family form.”260 The growing legal acceptance of nonmarital

252. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1819 (1985) (quoting letter from Max Weber to Edgar Jaffe).
253. Id. at 1820.
254. Id.
255. See J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph of Naked
Divorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519 (1994).
256. See John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1125 (1999) (describing same-sex marriage as “the ultimate societal
vindication of the reality of the lives of gay and lesbian people”).
257. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 884-85 (Vt. 1999).
258. Baehr v. Miike, Docket No. 91-1394 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
259. Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865, 869 (1989).
260. Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism in Family Law, in REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW
COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY 162 (David Blankenhorn, Steven Bayme & Jean Bethke
Elshtain eds., 1990).
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cohabitation is an illustration of this crisis of confidence.261 With
expanding recognition of a variety of new “family” configurations, the
law seems to increasingly accept a “functional” definition of the family
in which a family is identified not by what it is, but by what it does.262
This, in turn, makes courts more receptive to the argument that the law
needs to reflect the reality of same-sex couple relationships. Thus, the
Vermont Supreme Court held that “the essential aspect of [the plaintiffs’]
claim is simply and fundamentally for inclusion in the family of statesanctioned human relations.”263
Finally, family law increasingly seems to be willing to see marriage
and the family in contractual terms based on a primacy of the individual
interests of the parties involved rather than the intrinsic value of the
status of marriage or family.264 Nowhere is the implication of this trend
for the debate over redefining marriage more evident than in the recent
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeals which characterized marriage
as “without dispute, one of the most significant forms of personal
relationships.”265 In fact, the decision in the Alaska marriage case
included the judge’s holding that marriage needed to be redefined to
comport with a “freedom to choose one’s life partner.”266 In a similar
vein, the Vermont decision stated, “[i]n short, the marriage laws
transform a private agreement into a source of significant public benefits
and protections.”267 The Hawaii court described marriage in explicitly
contractual terms as “a partnership to which both parties bring their
financial resources as well as their individual energies and efforts.”268
C. State Constitutionalism Movement
As noted above, one factor in the success of recent marriage cases
has been the selection of forums thought to be receptive to the claims of

261. See William C. Duncan, The Social Good of Marriage and Legal Responses to NonMarital Cohabitation, presentation at the International Society of Family Law: North American
Conference, June 27, 2003, University of Oregon School of Law.
262. See William C. Duncan, “Don’t Ever Take a Fence Down: The “Functional” Definition
of Family: Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 JOURNAL OF LAW AND FAMILY STUDIES 57
(2001).
263. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 885 (Vt. 1999).
264. See Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of
Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1991).
265. Halpern v. Attorney General, 2003 O.J. No. 2268 (Ont. C.A. Jun 10, 2003).
266. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, Docket No. 3AN-95-6562 CI 1998 WL 88743, at *4
(Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998).
267. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 883 (Vt. 1999).
268. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) (quoting Gussin v. Gussin, 836 P.2d 484,
491 (Haw. 1992)). Interestingly, this definition is lifted from the divorce context in which parties’
respective financial resources are in dispute, rather than the context of marriage formation.
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plaintiffs. On a practical level, this has involved the selection of states
that are seen as likely to be receptive to the claims.269
The attractiveness of these forums, though, has its root in a more
fundamental development in legal theory: the movement to extract from
state constitutions more expansive rights than the United States Supreme
Court has been willing to find in the U.S. Constitution.270 The movement
began in the 1970s when Chief Justice Earl Warren was replaced on the
U.S. Supreme Court by Chief Justice Warren Burger and largely
championed by Justice William Brennan who encouraged state courts to
be proactive in finding new constitutional rights in state constitutions
rather than accepting the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution by the
U.S. Supreme Court.271 Though styled as a “revival” of past state court
activism, “[w]hen state judges turned to their state declarations of rights
in the early 1970s, they were not recovering a tradition but creating
one.”272
Professor Cain notes that the turn to state courts and state
constitutional claims has been particularly helpful “in the case of lesbian
and gay rights.”273 This assertion seems to be validated by the success of
the marriage litigation in Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont when compared
to the only federal decisions on the question.274 A number of state courts
had invalidated sodomy laws even before the U.S. Supreme Court did, as
in the instance of Georgia, with particularly unsympathetic fact
scenarios.275 The state-claims-only strategy also has the benefit of not
provoking federal precedent contradicting a court decision redefining
marriage. This reflects a reasonable political calculation that it would be
easier to convince a state court in a “progressive” jurisdiction to accept a
“right to same-sex marriage” than the more staid U.S. Supreme Court.
269. Cf. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 819 (1995) (“If a state tends to be more
‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ on social issues, same-sex marriage is more likely to get serious
consideration.”). Professor Brown also suggests (two years before the case was filed) that Vermont
would be such a state. Id. at 832.
270. See Patricia A. Cain, The Right to Privacy Under the Montana Constitution: Sex and
Intimacy, 64 MONT. L. REV. 99, 127-28 (2003).
271. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1097 (1997).
272. G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1097, 1117 (1997).
273. Patricia A. Cain, The Right to Privacy Under the Montana Constitution: Sex and
Intimacy, 64 MONT. L. REV. 99, 128 (2003).
274. See supra Parts II.A & II.D.
275. See Picado v. Jegley, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. Georgia, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga.
1998) (defendant convicted of sodomy for sexual relationship with niece); Gryczan v. State, 942
P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. 1996); Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
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D. Elite Legal Opinion
Perhaps the most important reason for the recent successes of the
movement to redefine marriage lies in its most basic characteristic: that it
has been pursued in the courts rather than through the legislative process.
Since 1995, thirty-seven states have enacted legislation that provides that
only marriages between a man and a woman will be recognized in that
state.276 Three states have constitutional amendments defining marriage
as the union of a man and a woman and one has an amendment allowing
the legislature to define marriage in that way.277 In 1996, the U.S.
Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act defining marriage as the
union of a man and a woman for federal purposes and providing that
states cannot be forced under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, to recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other
states.278
In his article on the decline of moral discourse in family law,
Professor Carl Schneider hypothesized,
that the trend toward diminished moral discourse is most actively
promoted by lawyers, judges and legal scholars who are, relative to the
state legislators and judges who would otherwise decide family law
questions, affluent, educated and elite. This group’s views on family
law questions are (relatively) liberal, secular, modern, and
noninterventionist.279

276. See ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107 (Michie 1987); ARK. CODE ANN. §
9-11-109 (Michie 1987); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104
(2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §101 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2000); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-3 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 1996); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West 2000); IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (WEST 1997); IOWA CODE §; IA.
595.2 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.00 (Michie 2000); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN.. art. § 89 (West 2000) (amended by 1999 LA. Act of July 2, 1999, NO. 890 § 1;
19-A); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. X, § 701 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.1 (West
2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.271 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West Supp.
2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (1999); MONT.; MO. REV. CODE ANN. § 415.022 (Smith 2000);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (1960); OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1
(West 2000); x PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law Co-op.
2000); S.D. CODIFIED. LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (1955); 2003
TEXAS SENATE BILL 7 (ENACTED MAY 27, 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (1953); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (2000); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603
(2000).
277. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §, 25; HAW. CONST. art. I, §, 23; NEB. CONST. art. I, §, 29;
NEVADA CONST. art. I, § 21.
278. Pub. L. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 & 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(1997)).
279. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1821 (1985).
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There is significant evidence that this hypothesis is applicable to the
same-sex marriage context and that legal elites, particularly judges and
academics, are much more sympathetic to the effort to redefine marriage
than are the legislators and the general public.
There seems little question that legal elites are more accepting of the
claims for legal recognition of homosexual persons and same-sex
relationships.280 After the Lawrence decision,281 a news report quoted
Mark Tushnet, president of the Association of American Law Schools, as
saying that “clearly, the legal profession and the law professoriate is
strongly in favor” of “gay rights” although he did not see any
discrepancy between the view of the legal elite and the general public.282
Contrary to Professor Tushnet’s assertion, the massive divide between
the way judges and legislators, respectively, have responded to the idea
of redefining marriage to include same-sex couples, indicates a
significant divergence between elite legal opinion and public opinion.
This is underscored by the success of ballot initiatives like those
approving the state constitutional amendments noted above. Another
commentator explained the willingness of U.S. Supreme Court justices to
“follow elite opinion, even when it diverges from public opinion” as
“only human” because “[t]he justices’ closest professional collaborators
are their extremely bright young law clerks, fresh out of elite law schools
where liberalism reigns supreme and the views of ordinary Americans
are widely scorned.”283 He notes that the Justices’ “reputations are
shaped by predominantly liberal news media, law professors, lawyers’
groups such as the American Bar Association, women’s groups . . . and
other civil-rights groups.”284 Interestingly, Human Rights Magazine, the
organ of the ABA’s Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities,
recently published an issue about same-sex couples including only
articles favoring greater legal recognition of same-sex relationships,
including a call for the repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act from a
sitting federal judge.285 There is also research which indicates that while
college graduates may be more “liberal” on the question of identifying
homosexuals as a discrete class for purposes of discrimination laws than

280. See William C. Duncan, “A Lawyer Class”: Views on Marriage and “Sexual
Orientation” in The Legal Profession, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 137 (2001).
281. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). Discussed infra at Part VI.A.
282. Tony Mauro, Scalia Lashes Law-Profession Culture’ LEGAL TIMES (July 7, 2003) at
http://www.law.com.
283. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Veering Left: The Art of Judicial Evolution, NATIONAL JOURNAL, July
7, 2003.)
284. Id.
285. See Deborah A. Batts, Repeal DOMA, 30 HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE 2 (Summer 2003)
and the other articles in that issue.
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the general public, law students are “slightly more liberal on this social
issue than are college graduates as a whole.”286 This same survey
indicated that law students “were slightly more supportive of gay rights”
after attending law school.287 This was one of only two areas where
changes in attitudes were noted as a result of the law school
experience.288
To this general favor shown by judges to elite opinion is added the
increasing willingness of judges to actively decide social issues once
thought to be the province of legislators. As Professor Ted Morton
observed in the context of the Ontario decision, “[i]ntoxicated by the
power and status of their new self-made roles as Platonic philosopherkings and social reformers, our judicial elites have abandoned any
pretense of neutrality between competing social interests in Canadian
society.”289 Similarly, Professor Harvey Mansfield, Jr. notes that “[e]ager
judges, unconscious of their own ambition and reckless of the
consequences, encouraged resort to the courts and have brought us close
to a condition in which a citizen is someone who sues.”290 Again, the
dearth of legislative action aimed at redefining marriage, compared to the
lawsuits attempting to accomplish the same result, is instructive.
Maybe the most important explanation of the sympathy for the idea
of redefining marriage among judges lies in the judicial habit of mind. In
his masterful article on constitutional interpretation, Professor Robert
Nagel identified the inquiry of much modern constitutional doctrine as
“rationalism” as defined by philosopher Michael Oakeshott.291 He notes
that “the rationalist prefers knowledge that is ‘susceptible of
formulations in rules, principles, directions, maxims: comprehensively,
in propositions.’”292 Professor Nagel argues that the U.S. Supreme Court,
“[i]n its drive to find ever more expansive values in the Constitution” has
been “deeply enmeshed in a general intellectual fashion.”293 He explains
the fondness for abstraction by noting that, “[i]f a value is sufficiently
abstract it will necessarily seem to have broad relevance to human

286. J.D. Droddy & C. Scott Peters, The Effect of Law School on Political Attitudes: Some
Evidence from the Class of 2000, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 33, 42 (2003).
287. Id. at 43.
288. Id.
289. Ted Morton, Gay Marriage and the Decline of Democracy in Canada, WINNIPEG FREE
PRESS, July 3, 2003, at A9.
290. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Returning to the Founders: The Debate on the Constitution in
AGAINST THE GRAIN, 439 (Hilton Kramer & Roger Kimball eds., 1995).
291. Robert F. Nagel, Rationalism in Constitutional Law, 4 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY
9, 12 (1987).
292. Id. (quoting MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS 10 (1962)).
293. Id. at 14.
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affairs, important or petty.”294 The abstraction favored by the advocates
of redefining marriage and accepted by the courts where they have been
successful, is the abstract concept of equality. The Hawaii decision
invoked equality between the sexes in its opinion. 295 That same idea was
accepted without question in the Alaska decision. 296 The three opinions
in the Vermont case all agreed on one point: that equality demanded
legal recognition of same-sex couples. 297 The majority invoked the Equal
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, 298 Justice Dooley favored a
measure of equality based on sexual orientation, 299 and Justice Johnson
would have followed the Hawaii logic. 300 The majority opinion in the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision indiscriminately mixed
equality and liberty arguments to reach its decision301 and the
concurrence would have followed the sex discrimination route.302
The problem, however, with the rationalist approach is incisively
noted by Professor Nagel. It is that “[t]reating social choices as a series
of intellectual problems is reassuring to many in the educated classes, but
it also tends to denigrate important values and to stunt moral and political
discourse.”303 He notes later that “to the extent that constitutional
rationalism forces communities to explain their decisions in terms of
relatively remote relationships between policies and objectives, absurd
purposes are postulated and important values are unfairly trivialized.”304
To return to the previous discussion of cultural changes, Professor Nagel
points out that the “demand for empirical validation . . . skews dialogue
away from aspiration.”305 In a recent book describing “gay rights” cases
litigated before the U.S. Supreme Court, the authors describe Justice
Lewis Powell’s discomfort with an analogy between Court precedent
regarding the “sanctity of the home” and sodomy raised in oral argument
in the Bowers case.306 Like the difficulty in describing the taste of salt,307
294. Id. at 13.
295. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993).
296. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743, 4-6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27,
1998).
297. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 at 886, 893, 898 (Vt. 1999).
298. See id. at 878.
299. See id. at 890 (Dooley, J., concurring).
300. See id. at 905 (Johnson, J., concurring & dissenting).
301. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003).
302. See id. at 970.
303. Id. at 15. As an aside, it is interesting to speculate what modern courts might make of
Justice McLean’s comment in his dissent in Dred Scott v. Sanford: “A slave is not mere chattel. He
bears the impress of his Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man: and he is destined to an
endless existence.” 60 U.S. 393, 550 (1856) (McLean, J., dissenting).
304. Nagel, supra note 291 at 16.
305. Id. at 19.
306. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 14, at 295.
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Justice Powell initially seemed to sense the incompatibility of a right to
nonmarital sexual behavior with the traditional values associated with
home and family. In the rationalist account, such a sense would carry
little or no weight.308
One of the most obvious targets of this judicial frame of mind is
tradition. Professor Nagel argues that “the courts often operate under the
assumption that beliefs which originate in tradition (and thus have the
advantage, at least, of being time-tested) are impermissible bases for
public policy, unless they can be justified by some rational standard
extrinsic to the tradition.”309 While some customs and traditions are
clearly not necessary, “to envision the Constitution as requiring a
presumptive hostility to the past creates the danger that courts will
prevent people from building a coherent knowledge and sense of
morality.”310 The court thus ensures that the laws that most intimately
affect the core social institutions of communities become the domain of
experts only. There is no place for the moral intuition of the mass of
citizens who may lack the empirical tools to sway courts, but who could
move majorities of their fellow citizens to enact legislation. Thus,
“[h]abitual denigration of traditional values carries the risk that certain
groups will come to see the Constitution as an alien document, used by
segments of the educated classes to belittle and undermine their way of
life.”311
The irony, as noted by Professor Hadley Arkes is that “judges and
political men are never more rigid and moralistic in their teaching as
when they are ridiculing moral judgment and professing to free people
from the tyranny of moral truths.”312 Thus, the equality or civil rights
paradigm begins to mow down everything in its path: tradition, marriage,
self-government, etc. Or, to use another analogy, the equality paradigm,
with which courts seem to view marriage, works as a procrustean bed:
what the courts see as extrinsic, like the unique contributions of each sex
to marriage, must be lopped off. Given all this, it is interesting to note
that the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment pending in the U.S.

307. See BOYD K. PACKER, TEACH YE DILIGENTLY 60-61 (1991) (analogy of the taste of salt
to religious knowledge).
308. See Nagel, supra note 291, at 17 (describing the strange rationale chosen to uphold
statutory rape laws and observing “that the serious grounds for the statutory distinction were avoided
because of the understanding, shared by all parties, that before the Court those grounds would
inevitably seem frivolous.”).
309. Id. at 21.
310. Id. at 22.
311. Id.
312. HADLEY ARKES, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE 4 (2002).
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House of Representatives is explicitly aimed at curbing judicial
incursions into the realm of marital benefits.313
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
With all that has happened, we are still left with some very important
unanswered questions. Specifically, (1) what does the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent decision invalidating Texas’ sodomy law mean for this
debate? (2) what are the likely future legal claims? and (3) what will
happen to marriage if it is redefined?
A. Impact of Lawrence v. Texas
When the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Texas’ law prohibiting
sodomy between same-sex couples314 and overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick,315 the national conversation seemed to turn reflexively to the
implications for the definition of marriage.316 It would be tempting to say
that Lawrence will have no effect on the debate over redefining marriage.
The majority opinion notes that its holding “does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.”317 More directly, Justice O’Connor,
in her concurrence, says that “other reasons exist to promote the
institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded
group” and characterizes “preserving the traditional interest of marriage”
as a “legitimate state interest.”318 Unfortunately, Justice O’Connor did
not specify the reasons that would justify the current legal definition of
marriage. It is also not clear how this statement squares with her earlier
assertion that “[w]e have been most likely to apply rational basis review
to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause where,
as here, the challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships.”319 Of
course, Justice Scalia’s dissent undercuts any possibility of consensus on
this point. He accuses the majority of making “no effort to cabin the
scope of its decision to exclude” same-sex marriage and in reference to

313. U.S. HJR 56 (2004) (“Neither this constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state
or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be
conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.”) (emphasis added).
314. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
315. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
316. See Evan Thomas, The War Over Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 38.
317. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
318. Id. at 2487-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
319. Id. at 2485 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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the disclaimers by the majority and Justice O’Connor regarding marriage
laws, says, “[d]o not believe it.”320
There are two possible ways in which the Lawrence decision may
have an influence on the debate over redefining marriage. First it may
contribute to the acceleration of the cultural trends discussed above.321
Twenty years ago, Professor Hafen noted that “a right of sexual freedom
cannot reasonably be inferred from the procreative rights recognized by
the Court, nor has the Court developed a general right of personal
privacy or autonomy broad enough to include sex outside marriage.”322
In contrast, the Lawrence decision marks the first time the Supreme
Court has recognized sexual rights unrelated to marriage or kinship. Such
a development seems very likely to contribute to an increase in the value
the law attributes to individualism while further decreasing the law’s
endorsement of normative ideals.
The second possible influence is that Lawrence may signal the
Court’s willingness to make decisions without constitutional justification
even if it means discarding precedent. Whatever the virtue of Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence as prophecy regarding the marriage
situation, he certainly is correct in identifying (1) the lack of rationale for
the Court’s invocation of floating levels of abstraction in identifying
rights and (2) the lack of consistency in the application of its doctrines.323
For instance, at one point, the Court seems very close to endorsing John
Stuart Mill’s “harm principle.”324 At other times, the decision’s
description of the interests involved is almost metaphysical.325 In
addition, at no point, does the Court use the language of “fundamental
rights” although that seems to be implied. The Court avoids any
discussion of equal protection analysis, hinting only that the reasoning of
Romer v. Evans326 (which is inexplicably called “a case of principal
320. Id. at 2497-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
321. See supra Part IV.B.
322. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy:
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 538 (1983).
323. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the irony of the Court’s
willingness to uphold Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 123 (1973), in the face of strong criticism, in contrast
to their willingness to overturn Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), partly as a result of such
criticism).
324. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Logman, Roberts & Green eds., 1999) (1869);
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
325. See for example, the court’s statement: “The instant case involves liberty of the person
both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.” Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475. The court also
cited the “mystery passage” of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992), which Justice Scalia derides as the “famed sweet-mystery-of-life passage” and calls “the
passage that ate the rule of law.” Id. at 2481, 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The court also said
“[Bowers’] continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”
326. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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relevance” though it is expressly not applied), provides a “tenable
argument” for striking down the law at issue.327 More significantly, the
Court twice makes reference to changing attitudes over time.328 Consider
also the Court’s reference to “values we share with a wider civilization”
and citation to foreign authority,329 though the Court leaves completely
unclear the contours of this source of authority.330 In the absence of some
limiting factors, it would seem to be entirely at the Justice’s discretion to
determine relevant foreign law. These portions of the decision can hardly
encourage those who would like to believe that the Lawrence decision
signals an unwillingness to resolve the marriage issue.
If this reading of the Lawrence opinion is correct, it would seem to
vindicate the charge, discussed above, that legal elites are becoming
more hostile to normative understandings of the family and increasingly
capable of comprehending the justifications supporting these
understandings. An example might be the Court’s account of the history
of sodomy laws. The Court takes a novel view of the historical record to
characterize the laws as recently taking on an “anti-homosexual”
meaning.331 While the Court is correct to note that sodomy laws did not
apply solely to same-sex couples until the 1970s, it is interesting that the
Court did not consider the fact that their own marital privacy case law
might have had something to do with that.332 The Court also did not even
mention the possibility that these kinds of laws might have less to do
with a heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy than with a marital/nonmarital dichotomy. To confuse things even more, though, the Court
expressly avoided equal protection rationale for its decision in order to
avoid some who “might question whether a prohibition would be valid if
drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct between same-sex and
different-sex participants.”333
B. Future Legal Claims
The next unanswered question is, what does the future hold in terms
of marriage litigation? Predictions are inherently provisional, but one
thing seems certain: the effort to secure a redefinition of marriage to

327. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
328. Id. at 2483-84.
329. Id. at 2483.
330. Did they poll the national laws of all foreign countries and side with the majority
position? Did they try to reflect European norms? If so, why? And why not Commonwealth
countries or former British colonies?
331. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479.
332. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
333. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
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include same-sex couples through litigation will not end anytime soon, at
the least because advocates have not run out of “progressive”
jurisdictions in which to ply their claims. Any hope that a “compromise”
such as civil unions would be seen as sufficient should have been
dispelled when, following the Vermont decision, a series of new
marriage suits were filed, both strategic (Massachusetts and New Jersey)
and spontaneous (Arizona).334
As has been demonstrated with the Vermont civil union status, once
one state provides for same-sex marriage, it is almost assured that
couples from other jurisdictions will marry in that state and return home
to seek recognition either as a married couple or for some discrete
marital benefits.335 This will require challenging their own state’s
marriage law and in the thirty-seven states noted above, the laws that
prohibit the recognition of such a marriage.336 Couples in Alaska, Hawaii
and Nevada will have to pursue litigation similar to Nebraska’s in federal
court to overcome the constitutional prohibitions in those states. A
challenge to a state’s marriage recognition policy may also involve a
challenge to the Federal Defense of Marriage Act.
In response to these possible scenarios, the proposed Federal
Marriage Amendment aims to end this kind of litigation.337 Of course, it
may engender legal challenges of its own.338
C. Future of Marriage
Perhaps the most important question, of course, is what a redefinition
of marriage would do to marriage itself. Advocates of the change ridicule
the idea that marriage will be harmed by redefining it.339 They
sarcastically ask who is going to leave their marriage if same-sex couples
are allowed to marry.
The danger, though, is not primarily in luring people out of their
marriages but in what same-sex marriage would do to marriage as a
social institution. As Maggie Gallagher has observed,
Normal marriage is normative. Marriage does not merely reflect
individual desire, it shapes and channels it. Marriage as a social
334. See Connie Cone Sexton, Gay Couple Sue County, State to Wed, ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
July 15, 2003, at B1.
335. See supra notes 221-35 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 276.
337. See supra note 313.
338. See e.g. Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33 (D. Idaho 1979) (litigation involving an effort
by the Idaho and Arizona legislators to obtain a declaratory judgment that the Idaho Legislature had
effectively rescinded its ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment).
339. See William N. Eskridge, Three Cultural Anxieties Undermining the Case for Same-Sex
Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 307, 313 (1998).
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institution communicates that a certain kind of sexual union is, in fact,
our shared ideal: one where a man and a woman join not only their
bodies, but also their hearts and their bank accounts, in a context where
children are welcome. Of course not everybody wants or achieves this
social ideal. In important ways marriage regulates the relationships and
sexual conduct even of people who are not married and may never
marry. Its social and legal prominence informs young lovers of the end
towards which they aspire, the outward meaning of their most urgent,
personal impulses. Its existence signals to cohabitors the limitations of
their own, as well as their partners’, commitment.340

In order for a social institution to have any expectation of fulfilling
these channeling and signaling functions, it must have some meaning. As
Professor Hafen suggests, “the contribution of family life to the
conditions that develop and sustain long-term personal fulfillment and
autonomy depends (among many other important factors) upon
maintaining the family as a legally defined and structurally significant
entity.”341 The strength of marriage as a social institution can be lost “if
the family is simply ‘a collection of individuals united temporarily for
their mutual convenience and armed with rights against each other.’”342
As Professor Dan Cere has argued, “[i]nstitutions like marriage are about
socially embodied meanings and practices, they are not just legal buckets
that you can fill as you like.”343
As a constitutional matter, if the right to marry becomes the right to a
marriage of one’s choosing, hasn’t the substance of that right actually
been eaten up? The right to a marriage of one’s choice is just a subset of
a right to radical personal autonomy.
This, then, is the risk of redefining marriage: the potential “collapse
of [marriage’s] social meaning.”344 The social meaning of marriage is not
arbitrary:
The law does not impose a pattern by strong norms of social
engineering; it protects and reinforces the boundaries of a naturally
recurring social institution with social norms that arise out of the need

340. Maggie Gallagher, What is Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA.
L. REV. 773, 790 (2002).
341. Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865, 867 (1989).
342. Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 585 (Cal. 2003) (Brown, J., concurring &
dissenting) (quoting Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1859 (1985)).
343. Dan Cere, Is Polygamy Next? Dan Cere weighs in (online debate posting), at
http://www.marriagedebate.com/blog/blog.htm (Aug. 2, 2003, 11:48 a.m.).
344. See Dan Cere, Give Me Polygamy Rather than the Death of Marriage (online debate
posting), at http://www.marriagedebate.com/blog/blog.htm (Aug. 6, 2003, 11:07 a.m.).
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to reconcile the differing sexuality of men and women and the personal
and social consequences thereof.345

Contrast this with the common argument in favor of redefining
marriage: that marriage would help tame some of the promiscuity
inherent in male same-sex sexual relationships.346 As one recent
commentator has noted, this “argument is a pure piece of social
engineering advocacy.”347 It assumes there is no difference between men
and women and that marriage has a social role quite apart from its
joining of men and women. However, as Maggie Gallagher has written,
“[m]en and women are not interchangeable units, sex has a meaning
beyond immediate pleasure, society needs babies, children need mothers
and fathers, marriage is a word for the way we join men and women to
make the future happen.”348 The U.S. Supreme Court has also noted the
inherent difference between mixed sex communities and single sex
communities.349
The really startling practical innovation same-sex marriage has
introduced is the endorsement of radically fatherless or motherless
homes. Clearly, there is a surfeit of such homes now, but the novelty is in
the significant change of removing any sense of concern for these kinds
of situations, because same-sex couple homes will be motherless or
fatherless by choice. While single people do have children with no
intention of marrying, there remains the possibility that they will later
marry or at least have a relationship with the child’s father or mother. In
a same-sex couple headed family, what would the roles of father and
mother even mean?
Whatever the variations in practice, the ideal of marriage is
inextricably linked to the reality that men and women become mothers
and fathers as a natural result of their relationship. Thus, they are
encouraged to commit to one another in a binding relationship for the
sake of those children and to further society’s interest in ensuring that
those children are provided for. Recognizing and, indeed privileging,
marriage is the law’s way of channeling individuals into this

345. Maggie Gallagher, Marriage Without Women: Maggie responds (online debate posting),
at http://www.marriagedebate.com/blog/blog.htm (Aug. 7, 2003, 9:09 a.m.).
346. See Andrew Sullivan, The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, TIME, June 30, 2003, at
76.
347. Melik Kaylan, The Way We Live Now, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2003, at A8.
348. Maggie Gallagher, The Future of Gay Marriage, at http://www.uexpress.com/
maggiegallagher (Aug. 5, 2003).
349. “Physical differences between men and women, however, are enduring: ‘The two sexes
are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community
composed of both.’” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)) (internal citations omitted).
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relationship.350 Without this message, marriage seems less like a social
institution than a term of convenience for intimate adult relationships. If
the law’s channeling function is impaired, other institutions may be
called on to provide that function, but without the resources, authority
and common currency inherent in legal norms, these institutions will be
significantly less effective in channeling individuals toward, and
channeling behavior within, marriage. At best, they can provide the
function only for their own members.
Already, the litigation to redefine marriage is producing a bankrupt
account of marriage’s meaning. The best example comes from the
Ontario Court of Appeals decision:
Marriage is, without dispute, one of the most significant forms of
personal relationships. . . . Through the institution of marriage,
individuals can publicly express their love and commitment to each
other. Through this institution, society publicly recognizes expressions
of love and commitment between individuals, granting them respect
and legitimacy as a couple. This public recognition and sanction of
marital relationships reflect society’s approbation of the personal
hopes, desires and aspirations that underlie loving, committed conjugal
relationships. This can only enhance an individual’s sense of self-worth
and dignity.351

Other examples from the United States have already been noted.352
The so-called “sexual revolution” of the 1960s helped to speed the
decline in the strength of marriage as a social institution by removing the
stigma from many alternative arrangements. Though this may have
precipitated a rise in non-marital cohabitation,353 the ideal of marriage
has been surprisingly resilient. To extend the revolution analogy, the
redefinition of marriage would be the Great Leap Forward,354 purging the
last remnants of social meaning and connection to children from
marriage.355

350. See generally, Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 495 (1992).
351. Halpern v. Attorney General, 2003 O.J. No. 2268. This might be the first judicial
endorsement of marriage as a self-esteem builder.
352. See supra Parts IV.A-C.
353. See Larry L. Bumpass, What’s Happening to the Family? Interactions Between
Demographic and Institutional Change, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 486 (Nov. 1990).
354. See PAUL JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES 550 (1983) (describing Mao Tse-tung’s effort to
“move to Communism in one bound”).
355. See. William C. Duncan, Whither Marriage in the Law?, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 119
(2003) (comparing the social meaning of marriage to a stack of blocks which may fall if certain key
blocks are removed and identifying the nature of marriage as a male-female institution as one of
those key blocks).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Regardless of an individual’s opinion on the substantive issues raised
by the effort to redefine marriage through litigation, it certainly is an
interesting story so far. It is also not over by any means. The events of
the next months and years will provide some clues as to what the future
will hold and crucial questions about society’s most central institution
will continue to be debated. Proponents will continue to assert that
equality is being deprived and opponents will continue to assert that a
radical change to the institution of marriage is fraught with danger. The
continuing civil dialogue engaged in by those on either side will be of
great value.
As an opponent, I think the following comment by Maggie Gallagher
in testimony before the Massachusetts Legislature provides some
important perspective:
Will gays and lesbians suffer if marriage remains an opposite-sex
union? The Census Bureau indicates that about one-half of one percent
of households now consist of same-sex partners. How many of these
wish to marry is unknown. About half of all opposite-sex cohabiters
marry. If the proportion of cohabiters that want marriage is the same
among same-sex as among opposite-sex partners, the upper bound of
the demand for marriage is one-quarter of one-percent of households.
Meanwhile, forty percent of children go to sleep in fatherless
households. The sexual liberty interests of adults in choosing their own
family forms should not trump the interest of state and society in trying
to strengthen marriage, and reverse trends towards family
fragmentation.356

In a previous article, I referenced a quote attributed to G.K. Chesterton:
“Don’t ever take a fence down until you know the reason why it was put
up.”357 In a time of family upheaval when many legal policymakers seem
to have “lost the plot about family life”358 the danger is that judges will
be tempted to remove a fence protecting marriage by discarding its social
meaning in an effort at social engineering in the name of equality or
autonomy. This would be a serious mistake. Better to invigorate the
understanding of the social meaning of marriage. Maybe, ironically, this
will be the ultimate outcome of the same-sex marriage litigation.

356. Maggie Gallagher, Testimony on the Marriage Affirmation and Protection Amendment
(H3190), Massachusetts Statehouse, Apr. 28, 2003.
357. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 918 (14th ed., 1968). See William C. Duncan,
Don’t Ever Take a Fence Down: The “Functional” Definition of Family: Displacing Marriage in
Family Law, 3 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 57 (2001).
358. Bruce C. Hafen, The Importance of Motherhood, AUSTRALIAN FAM. 11 (Apr. 2000)
(Professor Hafen makes this comment in reference to the United Nations).

